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Abstract
There is a tendency among social scientists and others to interpret the ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia Hercegovina as the result of a political policy carefully
orchestrated from above and systematically carried out. Whatever eruptions
of war violence might deviate from this interpretation are generally viewed
as primitive balkanism, pointless acts, banditism or mental aberrations.
Terms of this kind reect an uncritical acceptance of a central or national
leader perspective, dismissing as deviant everything that fails to go accord-
ing to plan, and denying the signicance of specic local and regional cir-
cumstances or failing at any rate to problematize and examine them. This
article describes a process the nal result of which can be seen as the ethnic
homogenization of a region, but only part of its dynamics can be attributed
to a policy implemented from above. Rather, its course can largely be traced
back to local vendettas and a long-standing conict between Franciscan
friars and diocesan priests. The case illustrates that a systematic study “from
below” is crucial to a better understanding of the dynamics and the develop-
mental logic of the processes of ethnic cleansing. The article concludes with
some theoretical thoughts which t into the current debate on civilizing and
decivilizing processes.
Keywords: Bosnia Hercegovina; war; violence; ethnic cleansing; decivilization;
Franciscans.
Introduction
In the spring of 1992, warfare had ravaged southwestern Bosnia Herce-
govina like a tornado. In no time, units of the Croat army and Bosnian
Croat militias had purged the region from Serbs. Then they proceeded
to the northeast.1 The warfare did not fail to affect Medjugorje, the inter-
nationally renowned pilgrimage centre where Mary, Mother of God, was
said to have delivered her messages of peace virtually daily to several
seers ever since 1981. During the eclipse of the state power, two local
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Croat clans had literally made each other’s lives impossible. They found
themselves embroiled in an all-out massacre, which was abruptly termi-
nated by the intervention of a passing Croatian army unit. What was left
of one of the clans ed the area. Since then, they have been continuing
their ‘war’ from a Roman Catholic refugee shelter in southern Germany
(Bax 1995).
However, peace seemed to have returned to Medjugorje and the vicin-
ity in the early summer of that year. Pilgrims from far and wide were once
again coming to the town. Their primary aim was to attend as many
Masses as possible at the large parish church. In addition, virtually all of
them wanted to pay a few visits to the young seers and thus come into
direct contact with the ‘special mercy of God’. The blessed ones, as the
seers were referred to by the pilgrims, lived with their families in mod-
ernized farmhouses, where they provided a kind of mini-services for the
pilgrims in special reception rooms. The Franciscan priests entrusted
with the spiritual care of the parish and responsible for this Marian devo-
tion had an ambivalent attitude to these mini-services. What was done
there was not always fully in keeping with Church guidelines. But since
they had long been involved in a conict with the Vatican and the local
Bishop, who wanted to oust the Franciscans as proprietors and adminis-
trators of the parishes in the region, they could not afford to take on these
extra problems. It was true though that for the Franciscans in the region,
the devotion could serve as a powerful weapon against the advancing
bishopric and as an ample source of income.2
Early in June of that year Marijana, the oldest and most widely
attended of the seers, was once again at the gate of her parents’ home
almost every day. To the left and right, ew two ags: one depicting the
Mother of God, the other Croatia’s national emblem – the red and white
chequerboard. With a friendly smile, Marijana would welcome the
guests, as the pilgrims are called in Medjugorje. As soon as a group of
forty to sixty of them had gathered together, she would lead them to the
reception room, where the Virgin Mary pronounced her daily messages
of peace to humanity.
Across the street from where Marijana lived, a narrow path led down-
hill. Behind the large mulberry trees, there were a few houses on either
side of the path. Since it came to a dead-end and the doors of the houses
were always closed and their windows shuttered, there was no reason for
pilgrims to go that way. People always arrived by motorized transport:
civilians in expensive limousines, charity workers in trucks of their
society and men wearing camouage in military vehicles without licence
plates. Jozo Barbari è – leader of the local division of Territorial Defence,
the national defence organization founded by Tito of which all adult men
and women were members – used to live in one of these houses. No one
had seen any trace of Jozo since Medjugorje’s ‘little war’, and at this time
Zdravko Primorac lived there with his relatives and friends. Zdravko, a
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native of Medjugorje, who once ed to Australia, where he became a suc-
cessful businessman, had since become quite a soldier in the war in
Croatia.3 When the tension rose in Bosnia, Zdravko seems to have
devoted his energy in arming the Croat population of the region. After
the region was ‘puried’ of Serbs, he formally left the army and withdrew
to one of the hamlets of Medjugorje.  Not that he ever stopped being
active on the warfront. He still organized weapon supplies, owned a few
small ammunition factories in the region and had a number of military
vehicles at his disposal. The people in Medjugorje said he had his own
army and called him Kapetan Zdravko. ‘KZ,’ they said, ‘does lots of good
acts for the people of the region.’
Outsiders would think the two worlds with less than a hundred metres
dividing them were totally different and separate. In one house there was
a world of peace, unity and tolerance propagated by Mary, the Mother
of God, by way of the Croat Catholic seers and led by the local Catholic
priests, the Franciscan friars. In another house there was a world of absol-
ute intolerance, cruel and heinous violence, genocide and ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’. However, as will be described in detail below, these two worlds of
‘faith’ and ‘violence’ are closely linked. The people who lived in Kapetan
Zdravko’s hamlet and the people involved in the Marian devotion were
part of the same age-old and tightly-knit  regional network of Catholic
Croat religious nationalists and local violence formations. This network
was largely responsible for the second wave of warfare in southwestern
Hercegovina, when Muslim communities were the main targets of ethnic
cleansing. This part of the total war process in Bosnia Hercegovina took
place within a year and a half, that is, from July 1992 to March 1994.
The following pages constitute an in-depth contribution to the ethnog-
raphy of the war in Bosnia Hercegovina. The description illustrates
among other things the relevance of a more systematic inquiry into its
local historical roots, for only then is it possible to comprehend the so-
called ‘absurdities’ and ‘incongruities’ and transcend the dichotomy
prevalent in the public debate on the cause of the war, namely, a spon-
taneous explosion of old tribal disputes versus mass destruction carefully
prepared and planned and carried out from above. The article ends with
a brief discourse of a more general nature about decivilizing and identi-
cation and about the civilizing of religious regimes.
Old resentment and new opportunities
Gradi¹ ka, tormentor and guinea pig
In the extremely hot summer of 1992 the northern part of Gradi ¹ ka was
ravaged and made totally desolate. Until recently Gradi ¹ ka, a village
with a population of about three hundred in a valley on the edge of the
Brotnjo Plateau, had consisted of two sections. The Defterov è i, said to
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be Muslims of Croat descent, lived on one side of the road, and the
Pavlovi è i, who are related to the clan of the same name in Medjugorje,
lived and still live on the other side.
The two groups never got along that well. The Defterov è i were the
older and larger group, and viewed the Pavlovi è i as foreign invaders.
After World War II, upon the insistence of the authorities, land was
offered to these homeless relatives of ‘Croat fascists’, or so it is said, who
came and settled there. The authorities,  who were Serbs, did not expect
these people to be able to last it out for long, and believed that they
would soon emigrate to join relatives elsewhere in Europe. But the
Pavlovi è i stayed where they were. As a minority group, they experienced
a great deal of harassment. And when they began to build their own
church, with the help of the Franciscans from the nearby monastery in
Hum, a period of regular obstruction began.4 Time and again, as soon as
they had part of the church nished, the Defterov è i did their best to
destroy it. The supply of water, an extremely valuable resource in this
dry region, was repeatedly blocked. The Pavlovi è i had their own men
standing guard, and as a result of skirmishes with their tormentors,
several Pavlovi è i were apprehended  and held prisoner in the nearby
town of È apljina. Much to the irritation of the Franciscan priests, who
wanted to build up a new parish there, the church could never be com-
pleted.
The expansion of the tourist industry in Medjugorje also provided the
Pavlovi è i of Gradi ¹ ka with new opportunities. Thanks, in part, to the
return of a number of emigrants, their community grew. The Defterov è i,
who wanted to take advantage of the new opportunities as well, were sys-
tematically prohibited from entering the devotional centre. Their resent-
ment grew, and they regularly engaged in acts of sabotage, with the taxis
of the Pavlovi è i and the Primoraci in Medjugorje as their main targets.
The rst wave of warfare greatly accelerated and intensied this whole
process of harassment and counter-harassment. And when in 1992 the
Pavlovi è i from Gradi ¹ ka took temporary refuge in Medjugorje, their
little church was burnt to the ground and a number of their homes were
destroyed. The desire for revenge was not only rampant among the
Pavlovi è i, but the Franciscans from Hum were also enraged after the
manhandling of two of their fellow priests who were working in
Gradi ¹ ka.
After his active period in the war in Croatia, Kapetan Zdravko had
turned to manufacturing ammunition and was said to be earning a
fortune. He was also experimenting with new weaponry: land mines lled
with metal pellets were his rst specialty in the region. They were fol-
lowed by an even more horric weapon, a grenade lled with metal
pellets to be red from the shoulder. In an empty yard that belonged to
the Franciscans of Medjugorje behind the recently completed Mary
Chapel5 in the hamlet of Bijakovi è , Zdravko and some men who lived in
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the neighbourhood, and ‘friends’ from elsewhere in the region, had
started to practise using the murderous weapon they dubbed a
minobaca è (rocket launcher). Once stories about how it worked had
spread throughout the region, these men adopted the same name them-
selves. Zdravko had made every effort to get the fervent Hercegovinian
nationalist President of the newly founded Republic of Herceg-Bosna
interested in his merchandise.6 However, to prevent international reper-
cussions, the army command, consisting of ofcers from Croatia, had
advised him not to purchase these weapons.
It is possible that Zdravko managed to interest the revenge-minded
Pavlovi è i from Gradi ¹ ka in his new armaments, because early in August
the Rocketeers from Medjugorje, that is, Kapetan Zdravko, men from
the Pavlovi è i clan from both of the villages, and some ‘friends’, gave
Gradi ¹ ka and the immediate vicinity ‘a thorough cleansing’ (ras è istiti
teren). Almost a third of the Defterov è i were savagely slaughtered, and
the rest of them ed to villages where they had friends and relatives to
await their revenge.
A few days later the young priests Jozo and Tomislav – who had for-
merly been in charge of building up the parish of Gradi ¹ ka, but had been
working in Medjugorje ever since the church there had been destroyed
– held a service in the Mary Chapel in Bijakovi è . Zdravko and his men
allegedly attended the service. As always, gratitude was expressed to the
Mother of God for her special grace and protection of the community.
Lak ¹ i è and the monastic treasures of Hum
Lak ¹ i è is about twenty kilometres from Medjugorje on the east shore of
the Neretva River. The village is of strategic importance because it links
the Medjugorje region to the large road from Mostar to the coast.
Before the most recent war, the population consisted of Serbs and a
minority of Muslims. In World War II, the Muslims had fought on the
side of the Serb Partisans, which now made them the arch enemies of
the Croats in the region, who had been members of the fascist Usta ¹ a
state at the time.7 During the rst wave of warfare early in 1992, the
Croat army thundering past had ‘puried’ the village of Serbs but, much
to the dissatisfaction of the people of Medjugorje, left the small Muslim
population unharmed.
This was one of the reasons why Kapetan Zdravko and his men had
Lak ¹ i è on their list of accounts to be settled, as it were. But there were
other reasons too. For the Rocketeers of Medjugorje, control over this
strategic spot was instrumental in their acquiring the petrol they needed.
With his eet of military vehicles taken as spoils from a former barracks
of the federal Yugoslav army in È apljina, Zdravko’s militia was probably
the strongest in the region, yet also one of the most vulnerable. Since the
Defterov è i, who had ed Gradi ¹ ka, were now said to be housed in the
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vacant Serb homes and a joint act of retaliation on their part against
Medjugorje seemed not to be improbable, it was important to move
quickly. Lak ¹ i è also had negative connotations for the Franciscans of the
region. Various of their fellow priests from the same monastery in Hum
had been killed there by Partisans in World War II having rst been
forced to accompany a convoy transporting the spoils plundered from
their monastery to the Serbian Orthodox monastic complex in Lak ¹ i è .
They had never been legally able to get their possessions back, but now
there was nally a chance for them to reclaim what they felt was right-
fully theirs.
Around the middle of October there was a short battle at Lak ¹ i è . The
village was attacked from two sides. Zdravko and his men crossed the
bridge over the Neretva River, and met with little resistance from the
armed villagers. Then Zdravko joined a group of soldiers led by a friend
of his from the vicinity of Hum who had attacked from the other side.
‘Within a few hours, the village was cleansed,’ one of my informants told
me. The Serbian Orthodox monastery had been carefully spared out of
pious respect for the treasures stolen in the past from Hum. The same
informant told me that Kapetan Zdravko had arranged for an escort to
bring the monastic treasures back to Hum, after which they all had a
festive meal together there.
The following spring, I noticed that a few Franciscans had started using
the Serbian Orthodox chapel in Lak ¹ i è . They were holding services for a
group of Croat refugees who had moved into the annexes, which were
largely still intact. On an improvized partition behind the altar, illustra-
tions of a few biblical allegories were anked by various sized versions
of the age-old Croat coat of arms, the red and white chequerboard.
The wine merchants of Vrata
The Brotnjo Plateau, which is where Medjugorje is situated, ends in a
small elevation. For centuries, it was a strategic passageway (vrata)
between two relatively fertile areas. Up until recently, this high point was
the site of some three dozen lovely white houses and a small mosque. But
late in 1992 the entire population of Vrata was slaughtered and the
mosque blown up. In March 1994 a new Roman Catholic church was built
on the spot. The project was initiated by the Franciscans of Hum and
largely funded by the self-proclaimed government of Herceg-Bosna.8 A
new Catholic community of Croats who ed from East Bosnia now our-
ishes there.
The Hamzi è i, a prominent Muslim clan of wine merchants, had been
living at this spot for many, many years. The primarily Croat inhabitants
of the region thought them ‘strange’ (strane) because they drank alcohol
and ate pork. According to the people who lived in the area, the Hamziè i
regularly held luxurious outdoor festivities – roasting pigs and sheep over
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an open re, and devouring them with numerous friends who came from
far and wide. But the Hamzi è i were also despised.
After World War II, when the Serb Partisans took over the adminis-
tration in the region, the Hamzi è i had acquired various privileges, such
as the monopoly for the sale of grapes and the production of wine.
Clashes regularly broke out between the Croat farmers from the region
– who wanted to produce and sell their wine themselves – and the new
monopoly holders and their agents. And after the mid-seventies there
was civic unrest as a result of the state helping the Hamzi è i build a gigan-
tic wine factory and plant vast vineyards. All this meant that the Croat
farmers, who had already lost much of their income, were now about to
lose the rest as well. They were afraid that their supplies would now be
virtually terminated. Local farmers violently obstructed the collecting
and merchandizing activities of the Hamzi è i. A few hundred farmers rst
destroyed the newly planted vineyards with their carts, and then set off
for Vrata, which they blockaded for some time. This resulted in a mini-
war with the armed police. The casualties included some fatalities, and a
number of farmers were arrested.
Hatred was rampant, and here too a small incident was enough to set
off the res of revenge. An accident – or perhaps a provocation? – at a
small roundabout just under Vrata meant trafc was blocked for some
time. So people had no choice but to drive straight through the village.
On its way north, a small military convoy of the Croatian army accom-
panied by one of Kapetan Zdravko’s guide groups also had to make this
detour.9 The private militia on guard at the homes of rich Muslim vil-
lagers were suspicious of the military convoy and ordered the soldiers to
retreat. The story goes that this immediately led to an armed skirmish.
Residents were dragged from their homes and taken to the mosque,
where hand grenades nished the drama. Homes were plundered and
partially ravaged, and the brand new wine factory was destroyed in
almost ritual fashion. The Rocketeers came back later, hung mines from
the lightly constructed building, and then invited everyone from the
neighbourhood to shoot at it.
St. Jacob’s Boys and the return of the Mother of God to La ¹ a Valley
There are four tiny villages in a row in La ¹ a Valley just above the Neretva
River. The largest village, Moski-Karabeg, is the religious centre of the
region. Before World War II, there was a mosque there and a large
Roman Catholic Mary Chapel that also served as the parish church.
Muslims and Catholic Croats were said to have lived there side by side
in peace. By the end of World War II, most of the Croats had ed to
escape the ‘purication’ campaigns of the new Partisan government, for
Moski-Karabeg was said to have been a fascist Usta ¹ a stronghold. Their
land and houses were taken over by Muslim villagers. The few Croats
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who remained behind with their pastor Jakov Kvaternik had been able
to get along for a while, but in the early sixties they too were driven off
by the authorities.  (They are said to have been betrayed by their Muslim
neighbours, who wanted their land. It seems that during the Usta ¹ a
‘purication’ campaigns in World War II, Jakov Kvaternik, who was quite
a zealot, and several younger priests had been involved in converting
Muslims in order to acquire territory and clientele for the excessive
numbers of Roman Catholic priests in the region.) In the all-out gunght
that ensued, several young men and pastor Jakov Kvaternik all lost their
lives. Some time later the authorities released the men who had been
taken prisoner. Some of them went to join relatives in Australia, where
they became members of one of the numerous ultra-nationalist Usta ¹ a
groups.10 Others, who were in the same clan as the murdered priest,
moved into the nearby Franciscan monastic complex Sveti Brgorac,
where Jakov had received part of his training for the priesthood.11 Jakov,
who had been such a fervent nationalist and sworn Usta ¹ a member in his
lifetime, soon became an object of veneration. A tiny chapel was built
for him on the grounds of the monastery, and a Mass was held there every
year on the anniversary of his death, when the men were said to swear
to avenge his death.12
First, however, the people of Moski-Karabeg were faced with a threat
from quite a different direction. It had to do with the age-old struggle for
control over the parishes in the region between the Bishop of Mostar and
his diocesan priests on the one hand, and the Franciscan friars on the
other. In the past few years, with the support of the authorities, the
Bishop of Mostar had managed to gain control of several of the Francis-
can parishes. By the end of the seventies, it was generally known that the
Bishop was negotiating with the authorities about re-Croatizing and thus
re-Catholicizing La ¹ a Valley. For the Muslims who lived in Moski-
Karabeg, this would mean losing the land they had taken over; for the
Franciscans it would mean exclusion from a potential eld of action.
However, because of the increased terrorist activities of the Croat
nationalists, who were traditionally closely linked to the Franciscans of
Hercegovina, the government kept postponing its plans.13 But when
these same authorities took ight at the start of the recent war and the
law of the jungle reigned once again in the region, the time was ripe for
‘double revenge’.
Zdravko Primorac was a regular and esteemed guest at the monastery
of Sveti Brgorac. In the course of time, various members of his clan had
held important positions there. He is said to have been approached by a
delegation of young Franciscans from the monastery – members of the
Kvaternik clan which had been driven from Moski-Karabeg – with the
request to accompany their families who wanted to return to the land
where their fathers were born. The various parties must have reached an
agreement, because at the beginning of March 1993, Zdravko and his
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Rocketeers raided Moski-Karabeg and slaughtered virtually the entire
population. Only a day later, the young priests from Sveti Brgorac
planted a Franciscan cross on the smouldering ruins and dedicated the
parish to Mary, the Mother of God.
In 1996 I noticed that one of the largest houses in Moski-Karabeg had
been turned into a parish house. Next to the entrance, there was a tablet
set in the wall to commemorate the village’s former priest, the almost
sacrosanct Jakov Kvaternik. Six young pastors lived in the house,
‘members of St. Jacob’s Boys’, as an informant with an Australian accent
laughingly referred to the former priests cum avengers from Sveti
Brgorac.
Ethnic demonization and total ‘cleansing’
The Croatian and Bosnian Croat army units that worked together to
‘cleanse’ Hercegovina and western Bosnia of Serbs in early 1992 then
proceeded to the north and east to cross swords with the armies of the
Bosnian Serbs.14 Under pressure of the circumstances, a coalition
emerged between the Croat army units and the ofcial Bosnian troops,
which soon consisted almost solely of Muslims. It was a shaky coalition
that only held up so long as Croats and Serbs were still conquering each
other’s territory and driving each other off and murdering each other. In
these horric battles, the Serbs also targeted the Muslims, who were just
as much their traditional arch enemies as the Croats.15 This coalition
between Croats and Muslims soon came to an end once a point of satu-
ration was reached in the ghting, the outow of Croat and Muslim
refugees expanded, and Croatia, Serbia and the international community
all started backing the idea of dividing up the area into ethnically homo-
geneous territories. Outright ghting soon developed between the armies
of these two parties. They each tried to expand their own territory as
quickly as they could and ethnically homogenize it. This latest develop-
ment in the war once again produced an outow of refugees, most of
whom settled in the cities.
This armed conict, reinforced from above, led in turn to large-scale
antagonism between segments of the population that had until recently
viewed each other as brother peoples and had mainly supported each
other in the wars of the past (Bringa 1995; West 1996). Particularly as
regards the Muslims, a dramatic process of demonization, forcefully
stimulated by the Croatian government, began to emerge. In their des-
perate attempts not to be totally overlooked in a two-sided division of
Bosnia Hercegovina, they were supported by a number of contingents of
Mujahidin, veterans from Afghanistan and other countries in the Middle
East. As a result of their military demeanour and their plainly mission-
ary activities focused upon establishing a militant and fundamentalist
brand of Islam, all the Muslims of Bosnia Hercegovina were soon known
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as Christ-killers who had to be vanquished at all costs. In their respective
regions, religious nationalists, Croats and Serbs alike, contributed to this
demonization of the originally rather liberal Bosnian Muslims (Bali è
1992; Malcolm 1994; Sells 1996).
In the spring of 1993 a Bosnian Croat army unit was ordered to return
from the northern front and establish law and order in the Hercegovin-
ian homeland. This was the start of the last stage of the total ‘cleansing’
of the region. In this stage as well, however, it was predominantly the
local, historical and religious circumstances that shaped the course of the
process.
La ¹ a Valley cleansing completed
The young priest Krsto Kvaternik compared life in Moski-Karabeg
(renamed Veliko-Kvaternik), now occupied by Croats, to life in an early
kibbutz in Israel. The work was done in shifts, and while one shift was
rebuilding the houses and planting the gardens, the other one would
stand guard. Raids from the three surrounding Muslim villages were a
strong possibility, especially since their regional radio station regularly
appealed to the Muslims to be vigilant and organize local civilian guards.
For the sake of their own safety, the Franciscan priests of Moski-
Karabeg had repeatedly called upon a number of members of their clan
who had remained behind on the monastic grounds of Sveti Brgorac.
These clan members discussed the situation with the monastic leader-
ship, but they did not want to go without protection in such troubled
times. This is why the young priests of Moski-Karabeg went to Kapetan
Zdravko to discuss the matter with him. He replied that he could not
provide any permanent protection, since his ‘group of forty men’ was not
equipped to do so. At a celebration in Grude, the headquarters of the
newly proclaimed state of Herceg-Bosna, he had, however, been
informed that an army contingent was soon to return to its base in
Bobanci near Grude. Zdravko agreed to consult with the commander,
whom he knew well.
A mere week and a half later, it was clear to one and all how the
request for protection had been interpreted.  Late one night, together
with Zdravko’s Rocketeers, the men from Bobanci raided the three tiny
villages in La ¹ a Valley. The meek resistance was quickly dealt with.
Before the houses were destroyed with hand grenades, the raiders were
able to take whatever they wanted. So in no time, La ¹ a Valley was
cleansed, Zdravko had a completely free transit route to the petrol
depots of Croatia, and the Franciscan regime could consolidate its posi-
tion there. A dozen women and a few young children were transported
out of the villages. They were to be among the rst residents of Dretelj,
the notorious killing camp only half an hour’s walk from the peace centre
of Medjugorje.
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A conference in Assisi and the fall of the wall in È apljina
The ever smooth information machine of Rome was receiving an increas-
ing number of reports about the diocese of Mostar being on the verge of
collapse. With the help of the newly inaugurated  President of Herceg-
Bosna, the militant nationalists of the Province of the Franciscan Order
of Hercegovina had conveniently taken advantage of the collapse of the
old state. In the past, after all, the state had stimulated the diocesaniza-
tion process of the Mostar bishopric, as a result of which the Franciscans
had lost countless parishes (Quaestio 1979; Bax 1995). Now that the tide
was turning, their main aim was to try and expand their regime again.
In an effort to promote peace in former Yugoslavia, in January 1993
Pope John Paul II held a conference in Assisi. The special problems in
the Mostar diocese were to be discussed beforehand with the parties
involved (Assisi 1993). It is hard to say exactly what was discussed, but
it is said in Franciscan circles that the Pope threatened to reorganize the
Province of the Franciscan Order.16 However, it does not seem to have
helped much. They had to exploit the fact that for the time being, the
chances of power were in their favour, or so one of the strategists of the
Franciscans informed me. Citing various examples from the history of the
region, he pointed out that this was how it had always gone.
È apljina was one of the largest recent Franciscan reconquests and is
one of the larger settlements in the region. With a population of 35,000
the town is strategically situated on the Neretva River at the junction of
two large motorways. It was only under extremely severe pressure that
the Franciscans had relinquished their basilica in È apljina in the seventies
to the Bishop, who immediately appointed a few of his diocesan priests
there. To prevent further problems, the government had a brick wall built
in front of the entrance, with police ofcers almost permanently on guard.
Despite this secular supervision, there were regular altercations at the
wall between loyal (that is, Franciscan-minded) parishioners and
diocesan priests.
The Serbs, who were the largest group in È apljina, were driven out of
the town in the rst wave of warfare. However, the tranquility that
ensued was short-lived. Para-military activities were going on in the
Muslim quarter of the town, and the local Croat militia was suspiciously
watching every step. Fighting seems to have broken out between the two
parties when the Muslims broke into the local arms depot of the Terri-
torial Defence. Tension developed when outside Muslim elements were
observed in the quarter and the Croat regional radio station issued warn-
ings about terrorist groups from the Middle East.
The Croat army division from Bobanci still had a few lines of action in
southwest Hercegovina on its agenda.17 Upon the insistence of the
Province of the Franciscan Order, attention was rst focused on the large
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Catholic community in È apljina, which was now being ‘threatened by
fundamentalist forces’. Their ‘rescue’ took place in June. The Muslims
who were taken prisoner were transported to two new camps not far from
one of the two Franciscan mother monasteries in the region. The victors
crashed a tank violently into the wall in front of the basilica, and from
what was left they made a monument headed with the Franciscan cross.
Stolac cleansed, Hrasno desecrated, Po è itelj depopulated; the next to
the last round
After some actions further to the north, the Croat army unit of Bobanci
continued its cleansing activities in its own region. Besides the capital of
Mostar, there were two small Muslim towns left in this part of Herce-
govina, Stolac and Po è itelj, both of them centres of old Ottoman culture.
There was not much time to waste, because an arms shipment from the
Middle East, intercepted in the harbour of Split, made it clear that more
help was on the way from there (Splitska Tjednika, 18 May 1993).
Stolac, with its four beautiful mosques, was attacked in late August.
The inhabitants of the town were taken by surprise, since only a few
months earlier the very same Croat army had conquered the town from
the Serb occupiers and the soldiers were hailed as liberators (Sells 1996).
The people were rounded up like cattle and transported to one of the
Croat concentration camps in the region. While the auxiliary troops plun-
dered the houses and blew up all the cultural monuments, Kapetan
Zdravko led a few military vehicles on to the nearby village of Hrasno
(Pasi è 1994; Riedlmayer 1994).
To Croat religious nationalists, Hrasno has a very negative ring to it;
in fact, they would prefer to deny the whole existence of this special spot.
It is the diocesan predecessor and adversary of Medjugorje that was a
topic of such heated discussions in local Catholic circles at the time
(Kraljica Mira 1978; Quaestio 1979; Ore è 1989). In 1977, two years after
the diocese took over È apljina, the Bishop of Mostar consecrated a
shrine in this village of Croat colonists from the north. It was devoted to
the Virgin Mary, referred to locally as the Queen of Peace. The devo-
tional centre was formally meant to be a place of prayer for reconcilia-
tion in this region, which had been scourged for so long by warfare and
hostilities (Peri è 1977). But Hrasno also had a strategic signicance in the
lengthy intra-church animosity. From this shrine situated about twenty-
ve kilometres south of È apljina, the last ‘domesticated’ stronghold in a
Catholic sense, the diocese hoped to further expand its regime in Muslim
territory through missionary work.18
After the Franciscan reconquest of the parish of È apljina in June 1993,
a religious elimination of the diocesan outpost of Hrasno was thus quite
logical. My informant in Hercegovina, married to a Dutch woman and
actively involved in the matter, gave me the following account: ‘It was
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our intention to remove the statue of Our Lady on 15 August [which is
the feast of Mary’s Assumption]. We were not able to reach Hrasno in
time, though we did succeed in the month of Mary.’ He told me how they
had gone there with a group of men from Medjugorje and suspended
mines from the tiny shrine after rst removing the plaster statue from its
pedestal and putting it in the car. ‘Hrasno was desecrated,’ he concluded.
He was not about to tell me where in Medjugorje the statue was now
kept.
After this detour, the war machine from Bobanci continued on in the
direction of Mostar, where the last scene of the drama was to take place
later that year. On the way they bombed Po è itelj, the Ottoman museum
town on the Neretva River, and transported the population to a prison
camp. Not a trace is left of the rich Ottoman tradition. And this indeed
was the plan, for Po è itelj was to become a Catholic town, as is demon-
strated among other things by the erection of an enormous Franciscan
cross on the top of the highest hill of the town.19
Except for Mostar, the so-called Republic of Herceg-Bosna had been
ethnically cleansed by the time of the wine festivities in October 1993. In
the summer of 1994, my military informant Tomislav put coloured indi-
cators on a map to show the progress of the ethnic homogenization of
Hercegovina. A decade earlier, Father Jozo had used the same method
in his Croat-German guest parish to demonstrate to me the course of the
battle between the Bishop of Mostar and the Franciscan community of
Hercegovina. His indicators were red and black.
Discussion and conclusion
There is a tendency among social scientists and others to interpret the
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Hercegovina as the result of a political policy
carefully orchestrated from above and systematically carried out. What-
ever eruptions of war violence might deviate from this interpretation are
generally viewed as primitive balkanism, age-old tribalism, pointless and
absurd violence, the acts of bandits, organized crime, or mental aberra-
tions (e.g. Bali è 1992; Denitch 1994; Donia and Fine 1994; Malcolm 1994,
1997; Cigar 1995, 1996; Geiss and Intemann 1995; Sorabji 1995; Me ¹ trovi è
1996; Sells 1996; Silber and Little 1996; West, 1996). Terms of this kind
reect an uncritical acceptance of a central or national leader perspec-
tive, dismissing as deviant everything that does not go according to plan
and denying the signicance of specic local and regional circumstances
or at any rate failing to problematize and examine them.
This article has described a process the nal result of which can be
seen as the ethnic homogenization of a region, but only part of its
dynamics can be attributed to a policy implemented from above. It is
nevertheless difcult to maintain that the process was the outcome of
primitive balkanism, age-old tribalism, pointless and absurd violence, or
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mental aberrations. On the contrary, its course can be traced back to
vendettas  between local communities or sections of them that might well
have been carefully planned but were not ethnically founded, and that
were often carried out on the same lines as the long-standing conicts
between Franciscan friars and diocesan priests.
This case illustrates that a systematic study from below is crucial to a
better understanding of the dynamics and the developmental logic of
processes of ethnic cleansing. Rather than being political oppositions, in
the social sciences ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ are interrelated and
consequently supplementary perspectives on how people live together.
The same line of reasoning is adopted concerning the involvement of
clergymen in the violence of war. To the extent that authors refer to it at
all, the conduct of the Franciscan priests in Hercegovina is almost invari-
ably condemned in the most negative of terms. These clergymen, it is
argued, behave in such an ‘abnormal’, ‘hypocritical’, ‘primitive’ and
‘cruel and savage manner’ (Vojinovit 1991; Schenk 1993; Mojzes 1994;
West 1996; Me ¹ trovi è 1996; Sells 1996) that they can barely be considered
Christian leaders. Here again, a perspective from above (the perspective
of the Vatican, of Christianity, of ‘how it ought to be’) is adopted in order
to arrive at a diagnosis. Everything that is not in keeping with it is dis-
missed as being an aberration. However, this clearly prevents us from
gaining greater insight into the reasons underlying the conduct in ques-
tion.
In this connection, Norbert Elias wrote the following paradigmatic
words: ‘Religion is always exactly as civilized as the social layer that bears
it’ (quoted in Goudsblom 1987, p. 49). Elias thus noted the need to go
beyond the ideal, the norm, the perspective of the leaders, and to focus
on the social conditions that make the Franciscan involvement in the war
violence easier to comprehend. For centuries, the Franciscan friars of
Hercegovina have been the indigenous leaders of a society of peasants
and shepherds dominated by powers they perceived as their enemies.
First the Ottomans, then the Habsburgs, and when Tito was in power,
the Croat Catholic population was dominated by Serbs. In all these cases,
the local population felt it had no choice but to take the law into its own
hands (Bax 1995). In periods of relative political tranquility, this ten-
dency did not get out of hand. The Franciscans were mainly religious
leaders who concentrated on the rites and rituals of the Church and on
settling disputes among the faithful. In that case, pacifying or civilizing
activities were the dominant mode (Bax 1996). The Franciscans had also
long dominated the educational system, thus almost monopolizing the
major means of orientation . However, when the state monopoly on
organized violence weakened, or disappeared altogether, as was quite
frequently the case in this region, the religious leaders also became the
secular leaders of their people. Owing to their extensive monastic com-
munication networks, they were able to mobilize the adult men and
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organize them into ‘violence’ formations in which they themselves some-
times occupied a ‘military’ position. The HOS, the rst military for-
mation ghting the Serb-dominated federal army, was mobilized and
largely steered by Hercegovinian  Franciscans. Through their inter-
national networks, these ‘warrior priests’ (Goudsblom 1988) also played
an active role in supplying arms. (This aspect of the Franciscan leader-
ship makes it easier to understand why monasteries and other religious
centres were so high on the Serb destruction lists.)
It is customary in the Western world of Christianity to view ‘faith’ and
‘violence’ as mutually exclusive and incompatible concepts. This preju-
dice – because in essence that is all it is – has to do with a far-reaching
division between what might be called secular and religious formations
or regimes (Bax 1991, in progress; Spier 1994; 1996). It is a division that
might now well be characteristic of contemporary Western state societies,
but one which only came into existence by way of a gradual process over
the course of many centuries. This division is also characterized by an
advanced level of civilization on the part of both regimes. In parts of
Bosnia Hercegovina not only has this division between the two regimes
not (yet?) been established in a permanent and comprehensive manner,
but also – and related to this – their respective civilizing processes are
rather capricious. For in the course of their development, they have both
exhibited a tendency towards civilization as well as decivilization. So, just
like state regimes, religious regimes are characterized by both civilizing
and decivilizing processes or tendencies.  Examining the inter-relatedness
of these processes between and within religious and state regimes can
enhance our understanding and help to prevent simplistic labelling.
The case described above gives rise to a few comments about an
important aspect of Elias’s civilizing theory, that is, the dynamics of
mutual identication processes. In general terms, his line of reasoning is
that civilizing processes are characterized in part by an expansion of the
range of mutual identication. In Stephen Mennell’s words, ‘. . . the
growth of the sense that other people, whom one does not necessarily
know personally, are probably rather similar to oneself, with similar feel-
ings and likely to behave in a similar way’ (Mennell 1989b, p. 106). Elias
did not develop an explicit theory of decivilizing processes, though
others, who largely followed in his footsteps, did make efforts to do so.
In particular, Mennell, and then Fletcher, devoted systematic attention
to the formulation of a theory of decivilization (Mennell 1989a; 1989b;
1990; 1995a; 1995b; Fletcher 1995, 1997). One of the central points in
their discourses is that the fragmentation of the state monopoly on the
organized means of violence coincides with the reduction of the range of
mutual identication. Although this line of reasoning would generally
seem to be accurate enough, its empirical application  is not such a simple
matter. In the region of Hercegovina described above, the locally ori-
ented identication (‘we villagers, Muslims and Croats alike, against the
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evil outsiders and against other villages ’) is decreasing and the ethnically
and regionally oriented identication is increasing.
Tone Bringa observed a virtually identical development, though unfor-
tunately no more than that, in a very different region in Bosnia Herce-
govina. There too, the mutual local identication of Muslims and Croats
is crumbling under the inuence of the violence of war and the regional
identication along ethnic lines is on the rise (Bringa 1993; 1995). In
neither of these cases is there any evidence of the kind of unambiguous
reduction in cognitive interdependencies accompanying the rising level
of danger, as is stipulated in the decivilization model. The conclusion
would seem to be justied that processes of identication and de-identi-
cation should be studied in combination (Wilterdink 1993; De Swaan
1997), and always in a clearly dened empirical context. What is viewed
and perceived as de-identication at the local level emerges at a higher
level of society as a reinforced or more conscious form of identication.
In this perspective, the war in Bosnia Hercegovina, no matter how hor-
ric it might be, can also be viewed as a decivilizing spurt (the term is
Elias’s) that is to contribute in the course of time to further civilization
in the Balkan region. No matter how absurd this notion of war as an inte-
gration mechanism might seem in the rst instance, it none the less
deserves further theoretical thought and empirical examination. 
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Notes
1. For more information about this rst wave of violence see Donia and Fine 1994;
Geiss and Intermann 1995; Denitch 1996; Me ¹ trovi è 1996; Silber and Little 1996; West 1996.
2. Further information about this contention within the Church is given later in this
article. See also Quaestio 1979; Ramet 1985; Bax 1995.
3. After World War II, President Tito’s regime of Partisans launched a large-scale
purge against anyone who had been on the ‘wrong’ side. In fact, this purge lasted into the
sixties and the region hardest hit by it was Hercegovina . In World War II, it had been part
of the Independent State of Croatia [NDH], an ultra-fascist and religious nationalistic state
headed by the extremely cruel Usta ¹ a movement. Many of the Croat Hercegovinians had
to pay the penalty for the systematic slaughter of so many Serb inhabitants of the region,
in which Franciscans priests played a prominent role. Many of them were executed, others
were sent to prison camps, but most of them seem to have escaped, with church ofcials in
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Rome playing an instrumental role in the process. In Argentina, Bolivia, Scandinavia,
Germany, Spain, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, these fervent religious nationalists
set up new violent movements under various names. In the seventies, they were regularly
active in former Yugoslavia. And when the recent wars broke out in Croatia and Bosnia
Hercegovina, large numbers of them returned to serve as the spearheads of any number of
action groups. For more information about these ultra-nationalists, see Alexander 1979,
1987; Wilson 1979; Coxsedge et al. 1989; Butler 1990; West 1996.
4. The Franciscans in this part of Hercegovina have two main monasteries at Hum and
Sveti Brgorac. Every year a number of priests would graduate from the seminaries of these
monasteries and be appointed to parishes in the region or to the numerous Croat communi-
ties elsewhere in Europe and overseas. Large numbers of lay people also received and still
receive their general education there: virtually all the Croat intellectuals, inuential poli-
ticians and statesmen of the region were educated there. The monasteries are not only
fertile ground for Hercegovinia n culture, they are also well known as hotbeds of extreme
religious nationalism. The monastic communities worked in close cooperation with the
Usta ¹ a movement, which was at the core of the regime of the NDH in World War II. These
monasteries and the Franciscans there also played an important role in the region in the
most recent war in Bosnia Hercegovina, as is amply illustrated later in this article. A great
deal has been written about the role and the signicance of the Franciscans of Hercegov-
ina during and after World War II (see, for example, Novak 1948; Paris 1961; Hory and
Broszat 1964; Falconi 1970; Jeli è 1978; Tomasevich 1978; Alexander 1979; Jeli è -Butiè 1983,
1986; Alexander 1979, 1987; Broucek 1988; Butler 1990; Steinberg 1990; Aarons and Loftus
1991; A. Djilas 1991; Schenk 1993; Denitch 1996; Sells 1996; West 1996). Barely any publi-
cations have appeared yet about their involvement  in the recent war.
5. There were ve of these Marian Chapels, one in each hamlet of the parish of Medju-
gorje. They were meant for the ritual meetings of the people who lived in the neighbour-
hood. The large parish church had virtually become the realm of the pilgrims, who held
services there hour after hour, each time in a different language. In the hamlet of Bijakovi è ,
services were also held for the ‘defenders of the community’. Not far from this consecrated
spot, up until recently there had also been a mass grave from World War II, where the local
Usta ¹ a division had slaughtered Serb villagers and thrown them into a ravine (Vojinovit
1991; Bax 1997).
6. By the middle of 1992, the former federal Yugoslav state of Bosnia Hercegovina
consisted of three ‘states’: 1) the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna supported by Croatia,
2) the Serb Republic of Bosnia Hercegovina consisting of Bosnian Serbs and supported by
Serbia, and 3) the state of Bosnia Hercegovina mainly populated by Muslims and recog-
nized by the West. None of these formations was territorially stable and ethnically
completely homogeneous.
7. This Catholic Croat Usta ¹ a state [NDH] was supported by Germany and Italy and
contained present-day Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina . The policy of the state was
primarily focused upon ethnic cleansing: all the Serbs who lived inside the borders of the
state had to be converted or driven off or murdered. Many Franciscans were actively
involved in the cleansing and forced conversions (see also note 4). The Muslims were not
the target of systematic persecution; they were generally viewed as Croats who had not yet
found Christianity and many of them had indeed fought on the Croat side. Much of the
present-day animosity between Serbs and Croats can be traced back to the period of more
than four years from 1941 to 1945 when the two groups were murdering each other (Toma-
sevich 1969, 1975, 1978; Kri ¾ man 1980, 1983).
8. It is generally known that the leaders of the ‘state’ of Herceg-Bosna, which formally
ceased to exist in 1995, were on extremely close and friendly terms with the heads of the
Province of the Franciscan Order in the region (Vulliamy 1994; Sells 1996; West 1996).
9. In addition to being commissioned to settle certain matters, for an exorbitant fee
Zdravko and his Rocketeers could also be hired to accompany regular army units and
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humanitarian convoys through alien territory. These para-military and quasi-military
activities were a traditional source of income for the people in this region (Soldo 1964;
Koljevi è 1980; Vego 1981; , Bali è 1992; Donia and Fine 1994; Denitch 1996).
10. See note 3.
11. It was common practice at the time for Franciscan novices of the mother monas-
teries at Hum and Sveti Brgorac to receive part of their training for the priesthood in Italy
at Assisi, and their physical and political training at one of the various Usta ¹ a camps in the
region, of which Siena was the most well known (Broucek 1988; Sells 1996; West 1996).
12. I attended this commemoration several times, but for a while without knowing the
whys and wherefores.
13. Ample information about these terrorist activities can be found in Kri ¾ man 1986;
Coxsedge 1989; Aarons and Loftus 1991.
14. The following section summarizes a familiar picture of the penultimate stage in the
war in the west of Bosnia Hercegovina . Extensive but rather supercial accounts of it can
be found in Donia and Fine 1994; Denitch 1996; Me ¹ trovi è 1996; Sells 1996; Silber and Little
1996.
15. Until then, Croats and Muslims were locally and ofcially referred to and viewed
as ‘brother peoples’ (Sells 1996). Muslims in Eastern Bosnia were the Serbs’ main targets.
The war dynamics between the three ethnic groups was thus inuenced by the politics of
geography as well as of demography.
16. The reorganization was indeed carried out, and since 1995 the Province of the Fran-
ciscan Order has been under the direct supervision of Rome. The friction between the
Bishop of Mostar and the Franciscans of Hercegovina had already been close to breaking-
point. The ownership of the parish of È apljina was one of the greatest points of dissension,
and the friction was also heightened by the other recent Franciscan reconquests and the
destruction that took place in Hrasno, which will be referred to in greater detail later in the
article. Various pro-Franciscan military, para-military  and political leaders in Herceg-
Bosna and Croatia also played a role in the conicts. They threatened, for example, to blow
up the Cathedral of Mostar the building of which had only recently been nished
(Nuhanovi è 1995; Silber and Little 1996). These militant individuals did indeed carry out
the threat, and in 1995 the cathedral was blown up. As a monumental memorial, a few large
chunks of the twisted metal of the rooftop are now in the monastery garden of Sveti Brgorac
at the foot of the large statue of St Francis. A sign next to them states: ‘Remains of the
rooftop of the Cathedral of Mostar’. This trophy is said to have been presented to the
monastery by a few militia men from the region.
17. The following information is based upon conversations with several leading Fran-
ciscans and an ex-ofcer who played a role in the actions.
18. As regards the signicance of shrines in this part of the Balkan as instruments of
expansion, see Bax 1989; Duijzings 1991.
19. The leaders of Herceg-Bosna renamed the town Komu ¹ in. More information on the
policy of totally destroying the past carried out by Serbs and Croats alike in the territory
that they conquered can be found in Pa ¹ i è 1994; Riedlmayer 1994.
References
AARONS, MARK and LOFTUS, JOHN 1991 Ratlines, Melbourne: Melbourne University
Press
ASSISI 1993 Giovanni Paolo II per la pace in Bosnia ed Erzegovina, Citta del Vaticano:
Libreria Editrice Vaticana
ALEXANDER, STELLA 1979 Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
—— 1987 The Triple Myth: A Life of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, Boulder, CO: West-
View Press
A case-study from rural Bosnia Hercegovina 33
BALI È , SMAIL 1992 Das Unbekannte Bosnien: Europas Brücke zur Islamischen Welt,
Köln: Bohlau Verlag
BAX, MART 1989 ‘The Madonna of Medjugorje. Religious rivalry and the formation of a
devotional movement in Yugoslavia’, Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 231–47
—— 1991 ‘Religious regimes and state-formation: toward a research perspective’, in E. R.
Wolf (ed.), Religious Regimes and State-Formation. Perspectives from European Ethnology,
New York: SUNY Press, pp. 7–29
—— 1995 Medjugorje: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Rural Bosnia, Amsterdam: VU
University Press
—— 1996 ‘Making holy in Medjugorje; the politics of meaning in a Bosnian village
community’, Journal of Mediterranen Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1–14
—— 1997 ‘Mass graves, stagnating identication, and violence: a case study in the local
sources of “the War” in Bosnia Hercegovina ’, Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 1, 
pp. 11–21
BRINGA, TONE 1993 ‘Nationality categories, national identication and identity
formation in “multinational” Bosnia’, The Anthropology of Eastern Europe Review, vol.
11, no. 1, pp. 69–77
—— 1995 Being Muslim the Bosnian Way. Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian
Village, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
BROUCEK, PETER (ed.) 1988 Ein General in Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen von Edmund
Glaise von Horstenau (3 vols.), Vienna: WUV
BUTLER, HUBERT 1990 The Sub-prefect Should Have Held His Tongue and Other
Essays, London: Bellman
CIGAR, NORMAN 1995 Genocide in Bosnia. The Policy of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in Eastern
Europe, Houston, TX: College Station, Texas A&M Press
—— 1996 ‘The Serbo-Croatian War’, in S. G. Me ¹ trovic (ed.), Genocide After Emotion. The
Postemontional Balkan War, London/New York: Routledge, pp. 51–91
COXSEDGE, J. et al. 1989 Rooted in Secrecy: The Clandestine Element in Australian
Politics, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press
DENICH, BETTE 1991 ‘Unbury the Victims: Rival Exhumantions and Nationalist
Revivals in Yugoslavia’, paper delivered at the American Anthropological Association
Annual Meeting, Chicago, pp. 1–14
—— 1994 ‘Dismembering Yugoslavia: nationalist ideology and the symbolic revival of
genocide’, American Ethonologist, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 367–90
DENITCH, BOGDAN 1996 Ethnic Nationalism. The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia,
Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press
DJILAS, ALEKSA 1991 The Contested Country. Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revol-
ution, 1919–1953, Cambrigde, MA: Harvard University Press
DUIJZINGS, GER 1991 ‘Van het rechte pad geraakt. Gezamenlijke  pelgrimages van
moslims en christenen in Joegoslavie en Albanië’, in W. Jansen and H. de Jonge (eds),
Islamitische pelgrimstochten, Muiderberg: Coutinho, pp. 113–27
DONIA, ROBERT J. and FINE JR., JOHN V. A. 1994 Bosnia and Hercegovina: A
Tradition Betrayed, London: Hurst and Company
FALCONI, CARLO 1970 The Silence of Pius XII, Rome: Sirana
FLETCHER, JONATHAN 1995 ‘Towards a theory of decivilizing processes’, Amsterdam
Sociologisch Tijdschrift, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 283–97
—— 1997 Violence and Civilization. An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias, London:
Polity Press
GEISS, I. and INTERMANN, G. 1995 Der Jugoslawienkrieg, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag
Moritz Diesterweg
GOUDSBLOM, JOHAN 1987 De Sociologie van Norbert Elias, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff
Informatief
34 Mart Bax
—— 1988 ‘Priesters en krijgers’, in Johan Goudsblom, Taal en sociale werkelijkheid. Soci-
ologische stukken, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff Informatief, pp. 104–32
HORY, LADISLAUS and BROSZAT, MARTIN 1964 Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat,
1941–1945 (2 vols), Stuttgart: SUV
JELI È , I. 1978 Hrvatska u ratu i revolucija 1941–1945, Zagreb: Ciral
JELI È -BUTI È , FIKRITH 1983 Hrvatska seljacka stranke, 1941–1945, Zagreb: Ciral
—— 1986 Cetni è i u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb: Ciral
KOLJEVI È , SVETOZAR 1980 The Epic in the Making, Oxford: Clarendon Press
KRI ® MAN, BOEDAN 1980 Pavelic izmedju Hitlera i Musolinija, Zagreb: Ciral
—— 1983 Usta ¹ e i tre è i Reich, II, Zagreb: Ciral
—— 1986 Pavelic u bjekstvu, Zagreb: Ciral
KRALJICA, MIRA 1978 Kraljica Mira Hrasno u 40 Slika u Boji, Hrasno: Zupni Ured
MALCOLM, NOEL 1994 Bosnia. A Short History, London: Papermac
MENNELL, STEPHEN 1989a Norbert Elias. Civilization and the Human Self-Image,
Oxford: Blackwell
—— 1989b ‘Short-term interests and long-term processes: the case of civilization and deciv-
ilization’, in J. Goudsblom et al., Human History and Social Process, Exeter: Exeter
University Press, pp. 93–127
—— 1990 ‘Decivilizing processes: theoretical signicance and some lines of research’, Inter-
national Sociology, vol. 5, pp. 205–23
—— 1995a ‘Civilization and Decivilization,  Civil Society and Violence’, Inaugural Lecture,
Dublin: University College Dublin
—— 1995b The formation of we-images: a process theory’, in C. Calhoun (ed.), Social
Theory and the Politics of Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 175–97
ME © TROVI È , STJEPAN G. 1996 Genocide after Emotion. The Postemotional Balkan
War, London/New York: Routledge
MOJZES, P. 1994 Yugoslavian Inferno. New York: Continuum Press
NOVAK, VIKTOR 1948 Magnum Crimen: Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb:
Ciral
NUHANOVI È , G. 1995 ‘ © u ¹ ak and the Franciscan friars of Hercegovina ’, Globus, vol.
259/260
ORE È , LEONARD 1989 Medjugorje, Zagreb: Turistkomerc
PARIS, EDMUND 1961 Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941–45, Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press
PA © I È , A. 1994 Islamic Architecture in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Istanbul: Research Centre
for Islamic History
PERI È , R. 1977 Prijestolje Mudrosti, Mostar: Biskupski Ordinarijat
QUAESTIO 1979 Quastio Hercegoviniensis, Duvno: ZOD
RAMET, PEDRO 1985 ‘Factionalism in church-state interaction: the Croatian Catholic
Church in the 1980s’, Slavic Review, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 298–315
RIEDLMAYER, ANTON 1994 Killing Memory: Bosnia’s Cultural Heritage and Its
Destruction , Haverford: Community of Bosnia Foundation
SCHENK, G. 1993 God with Us: The Role of Religion in Conicts in former Yugoslavia,
Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute
SELLS, MICHAEL A. 1996 The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia,
Berkeley and London: University of California Press
SILBER, LAURA and LITTLE, ALLAN 1996 The Death of Yugoslavia (rev. edn),
London: Penguin Books
SOLDO, JOZO 1964 È itluk i Brotnjo: Istorija, Zagreb: Privredni Vjesnik
SORABJI, C. 1995 ‘A very modern war: terror and territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina’, in R.
A. Hinde and H. E. Watson (eds), War, Cruel Necessity? The Bases of Institutionalized
Violence, London: Tauris, pp. 80–95
A case-study from rural Bosnia Hercegovina 35
SPIER, FRED 1994 Religious Regimes in Peru, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press
—— 1996 The Structure of Big History: From the Big Bang until Today, Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press
STEINBERG, JONATHAN 1990 All or Nothing, The Hague: Mouton
SWAAN, ABRAM DE 1997 ‘Uitdijende kringen van desidenticatie: gedachten over
Ruanda’, Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 3–24
TOMASEVICH, JOZO 1969 ‘Yugoslavia during the Second War’, in W. Vu è inich (ed.),
Contemporary Yugoslavia, Berkeley, CA: University of Calfornia Press
—— 1975 The Chetniks, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
—— 1978 War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Ustashe. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press
VEGO, MARIO 1981 Historija Brotnja, Citluk: Svjetlost
VOJINOVIT, N. 1991 Genocid Hrvatskh klerousta ¹ a nad srbima u herè egovini, Titograd:
Doba
VULLIAMY, EDHARD 1994 Seasons in Hell, New York: St. Martin’s Press
WEST, RICHARD 1996 Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, New York: Carroll &
Graf Publishers
WILSON, DUNCAN 1979 Tito’s Yugoslavia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
WILTERDINK, NICO 1993 Ongelijkheid en interdependentie: ontwikkelingen in
Welstandsverhoudingen, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff
M. M. G. BAX is Professor of Political Anthropology at the Vrije Uni-
versiteit of Amsterdam.
ADDRESS: Department of Anthropology, Vrije Universiteit, De Boele-
laan 1081c, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
36 Mart Bax
